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Abstract—Security for Next Generation Networks
(NGNs) is an attractive topic for many research groups.
The Y-Comm security group believes that a new security
approach is needed to address the security challenges in
4G networks. This paper sheds light on our approach
of providing security for the Y-Comm architecture as an
example of 4G communication frameworks. Our approach
proposes a four-layer security integrated module to protect
data and three targeted security models to protect different
network entities, thus providing security in different situ-
ations without affecting the dynamics of the 4G networks.
Index Terms—Heterogeneous Networks, Security Mod-
els, Integrated Security Module, Y-Comm Framework
I. INTRODUCTION TO Y-COMM
Future communication systems must provide ubiqui-
tous connectivity where users are always connected from
anywhere and at any time. The need for continuous
connection is being met by the development and de-
ployment of a number of wireless technologies includ-
ing 3G/HSPDA, WLAN, with 802.11n being the latest
network that is being deployed, WiMax and satellite
communications.
However, the widespread deployment of wireless net-
works will have a significant impact on the evolution of
the Internet. These developments mean that soon, it will
not be possible to think of the Internet as a single unified
infrastructure [1]. It would be better to view the Internet
as comprising a fast core network with slower peripheral
networks attached around the core. The core network will
consist of a super-fast backbone using optical switches
and fast access networks which use ATM and MPLS.
Most of these peripheral networks will make use of
wireless technologies described above.
Y-Comm is an architecture for heterogeneous net-
working [2], [3]. The architecture consists of two frame-
works.
The Peripheral Framework deals with issues in pe-
ripheral networks while the Core Framework deals with
Fig. 1: The Y-Comm Framework
issues in the core network. The Y-Comm architecture is
shown in Figure 1. In this architecture, the Peripheral
Framework and the Core Framework are brought to-
gether to represent a future telecommunications environ-
ment which supports heterogeneous devices, disparate
networking technologies, network operators and service
providers. One of the key goals of the Y-Comm archi-
tecture is to address security in a more comprehensive
way compared with other networking paradigms because
Y-Comm closely integrates security with the communi-
cations architecture.
II. Y-COMM SECURITY FRAMEWORK
Y-Comm employs a multi-layer security model which
must be applied to both the Peripheral and Core Frame-
work simultaneously to provide total security. The secu-
rity layers must work together across both frameworks
in order to be fully integrated with the new architecture.
The important point to note is that the need to support
heterogeneous networking with open architectures means
that security should not only protect data but entities
2as well. The highest layer of security is at layer seven
and is called Service and Application Security or SAS.
In the Peripheral Framework, SAS defines the AAAC
functions at the end-device and is used to authenticate
users and applications. SAS in the Core Framework
provides AAAC functions for services on the Service
Platform in the core network.
The next security layer is called QoS-Based Security
or QBS and is concerned with QoS issues and the
changing QoS demands of the mobile environment as
users move around [4], [5]. In addition, in order to meet
their service-level agreements, servers may choose to
replicate services closer to the current position of the
mobile. So it is necessary to ensure that core endpoints
and peripheral networks are not overloaded. The QBS
layer also attempts to block QoS related attacks, such
as Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks on networks and
servers.
The next security layer is at layer five, and is called
Network Transport Security or NTS. In the Periph-
eral Framework, NTS is concerned with access to and
from end-devices and the visibility of these devices
and services on the Internet. In the Core Framework,
NTS is used to set up secure connections through the
core network. So NTS in the Core Framework involves
setting up secure tunnels between core endpoints using
mechanisms such as IPsec to ensure that moving data
across the core network is done in a secure manner.
Fig. 2: The Complete Y-Comm Architecture
Finally, the fourth and last level of security is defined
at layer four but can also encompass layers three and
two. It is called Network Architecture Security or NAS.
In the Peripheral Framework, it attempts to address
security issues involved in using particular networking
technologies and the security threats that occur from
using a given wireless technology. So when a mobile
device wishes to use any given network, NAS is invoked
to ensure that the user is authorized to do so. NAS also
ensures that the local LAN environment is as secure as
possible. In the Core Framework, NAS is used to secure
access to the programmable infrastructure. NAS in this
context determines which switchlets, routelets or base-
station resources may be used by the network manage-
ment system. The full Y-Comm architecture including its
security layers is shown in Figure 2. Since the security
framework is integrated with the Core and Peripheral
Frameworks within Y-Comm, these security functions
being part of the communications architecture can be
used to much greater effect than previous methods.
A. Security Models in Y-Comm
The security layers described above are concerned
with the management of secure data transport and the
authentication of mobile devices and services. However,
because Y-Comm is an open architecture, it is also
necessary to protect entities such as users, servers and
network infrastructure. Y-Comm is therefore able to
offer three distinct network security models [6]. The
first model is called the Connection Security model, the
second security model is called the Ring-Based Security
model and the third security model is called the Vertical
Handover Security model.
Fig. 3: The Connection Security Model
B. The Connection Security Model
In this model, the different security layers work to-
gether to establish a connection between a mobile node
(MN) and a service being hosted at another site. The
main idea is that end-users must use the security layers to
connect to each other and this allows the system to setup,
maintain and monitor the connection. The Connection
3Security model is highlighted in Figure 3. We can show
how the security framework is used by looking at the
interaction involved in setting up a connection. This is
shown as a series of steps.
• Step 1: The server is started. The NAS module in
the server talks to the NAS module on the Local
LAN to get access to its wireless infrastructure.
• Step 2: The QBS security module on the server
informs the QBS module in the core network about
its Service Level Agreement which contains the
QoS associated with a connection to this service.
• Step 3: The mobile node is started. The NAS mod-
ule in the mobile node contacts the NAS module
in the peripheral networks to gain access to the
wireless infrastructure.
• Step 4: When the mobile node wants to use the ser-
vice, the QBS Module in the mobile node contacts
the QBS module in the core network and asks for
a connection with a given quality of service to be
made to the Server. The QBS module returns two
core endpoints which must be used to set up the
connection.
• Step 5: The NTS module on the mobile node
contacts the NTS module in the core network and
says that it would like a connection to the server,
using the core endpoints, the QoS and security
parameters.
• Step 6: The NTS module in the core network
contacts the NTS module on the server to signal
an incoming call. At this point, the server can also
check the security details of the client as well as
the security of the connection.
• Step 7: If the server accepts the request, then the
NTS module in the core network joins the two core
endpoints.
• Step 8: It then signals to both the client and server
that a connection has been established.
C. Ring-Based Security Model
Ring-Based security is an extension of Off-by-Default,
an idea introduced by Ballani, et al. [7]. See Figure 4.
The Ring-Based concept does not allow servers to be
directly accessible over a WAN such as the Internet with-
out initially interacting with the network infrastructure.
This is done by using the concept of scope where a server
acts only within a given scope.
There are 3 scopes:
• Local: Only processes on the same machine are
allowed to use a local server. This is enforced by
the SAS layer on the local machine.
Fig. 4: The Ring-Based Security Model
• LAN: Only processes on the same network are
allowed to access these servers. This is enforced
by the NAS layer of the peripheral network. These
servers must register with a Local DNS and are
made available to mobile devices when users are
cleared to use the peripheral network.
• Global: Global Servers are accessible from any
point via the core network using Global Services.
This therefore involves the Core NTS and QBS
layers. In addition, servers must register with the
Global DNS which is also managed by the core
network to allow WAN access.
D. Vertical Handover Security Model
Vertical handover mechanisms [8] involve the ac-
quisition and the release of network resources as the
mobile nodes moves around. In current cellular networks,
handover is controlled by the network to which the
mobile is attached. However, handover mechanisms such
as Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) [9] and Fast Mobile IPv6
(FMIPv6) [10] use client-based handover. Y-Comm also
uses client-based handover to support heterogeneous
networking [11]. In such circumstances, it is necessary
to ensure that mobile nodes do not try to abuse network
resources. This is the purpose of the Vertical Handover
Security model.
As shown in Figure 5, in addition to the Authentica-
tion, Authorization, Auditing and Cost (AAAC) servers,
new entities are involved in the Vertical Handover Se-
curity Model (VHSM); the QoS Brokers (QoSB) which
monitor the network performance and QoS-related is-
sues; they accomplish this using admission control and
auditing mechanisms. This model is given by the steps
below:
4• Step 1: The QBS layer of the MN asks the QBS
of the QoSB about potential target networks for
handover with required QoS and security level.
• Step 2: The request is passed to the QBS layer of
the Core endpoint.
• Step 3: If this information has not been already
in the Core-End point, the QoS Brokers of all the
available networks are probed by the core endpoint.
At the end of this first stage, the MN has a clear
idea of the QoS and security suits available at all
potential networks in the vicinity and could decide
on the target network for future handover.
• Step 4: The NAS layer of the MN initiates a Re-
authentication process to lunch the security mecha-
nisms in the target network.
• Step 5: Through its NAS layer, the currently serving
AAA server (CAAA) forwards the re- authentica-
tion request along with core information that are
used to derive a fresh set of the security parameters
for the new network to the NAS layer of a Central
Authority (CA) in the Core endpoint.
• Step 6: If the target network is located in the core-
endpoint, CAs NAS layer passes the core infor-
mation to the target network to derive the security
materials and achieves the triple A tasks.
Fig. 5: The Vertical Handover Security Model
The MN will check whether it has the same security
parameters the AAA of the target network has generated
using core information. In case of a match this means
that the new network is authentic.
Moreover, we presume certain trust relationships be-
tween the AAA servers, different trust relationship mod-
els might be implemented such as parent-child model
where the top level Authority in the Core-endpoint issues
certificates for all the AAAC servers working in its zone.
Alternatively, current Authentication and Key Agreement
protocols such as EAP as defined in RFC 5247 [12],
might be used to set up a lower-layer secure association
among AAA servers.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have showed how the new communications ar-
chitecture for heterogeneous networking called Y-Comm
can have a multi-layer security framework. The integra-
tion of the various layers into the security framework as
well as the fact that the model itself is closely integrated
with the overall architecture make it possible to design
new security solutions. We believe that the security
models introduced using the Y-Comm architecture su-
persede a lot of security techniques being used today,
including firewalls and Network Address Translation
(NAS), leading to a more secure but also a more efficient
network infrastructure.
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